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ARTICLE

U.S. Discovery in Aid of Investor-State
Arbitrations: A Blessing or a Curse?
MELISSA STEAR GORSLINE† & MARIA PRADILLA PICAS††

I.

INTRODUCTION

Many U.S. lawyers and their clients, and even the U.S. Supreme
Court, believe that arbitration is a faster, cheaper alternative to
traditional litigation.1 And, in general, they are correct in that belief;
a typical arbitration lacks the lengthy and costly motions and
discovery processes one finds in U.S. litigation.2 But not all
† Ms. Gorsline is a partner in Jones Day’s Global Disputes practice, resident
in Washington, D.C. She is also an adjunct professor at the University of Maryland
Carey School of Law, and Vice Chair of the Board of Governors of the
International Practice Section of the Virginia State Bar. Ms. Gorsline holds a B.A.
from Duke University and a J.D. from the George Washington University School
of Law. The views set forth herein are the personal views of the author and do not
necessarily reflect those of the law firm with which she is associated.
†† Ms. Pradilla Picas is an associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Jones
Day, and holds a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center and a MIB from
Florida International University. The views set forth herein are the personal views
of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the law firm with which she is
associated.
1. S. I. Strong, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782: Distinguishing
International Commercial Arbitration and International Investment Arbitration, 1
STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 295, 302 (2013); Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. Animal Feeds
Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010) (“In bilateral arbitration, parties forgo the
procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of
private dispute resolution: lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability
to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.”).
2. See NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 190–91 (2d Cir. 1999)
(explaining that efficiency and cost-effectiveness are characteristics of arbitration
which are “at odds with full-scale litigation in the courts, and especially at odds
with the broad-ranging discovery made possible by the Federal Rules of Civil
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arbitrations can be said to follow the “faster and cheaper” model. In
particular, international Investor-State arbitrations (ISAs), which are
decided by international tribunals governed by bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) or similar instruments, have long been the exception
to the general rule. 3 One reason is that the stakes are usually higher in
these arbitrations than in typical commercial arbitrations. For
example, according to 2014 data, the average amount claimed in
ISAs is nearly USD $500,000,000.4 Another reason is that ISA
disputes generally involve complicated issues of law, applied to
highly contentious, technical and factual scenarios. 5
As one
commentator has noted, these are “high-profile, bet-the-company and
bet-the-country issues,” and their legal and factual complexities have
led them to be dubbed “the brain surgery of international
arbitration.”6
With these factors rendering ISA disputes longer and costlier,
they were already more akin to litigation than to traditional
commercial arbitration.7 The expected cost and time associated with
ISA disputes increases still further when one considers that U.S.
discovery is increasingly being sought in aid of such arbitrations. In
2004, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc.8 expanded the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1782, paving the
way for U.S. discovery in aid of ISAs, thereby potentially increasing
Procedure.”).
3. See Lindsay Fortado, Arbitration’s Glamorous Side; Investment Treaty
Arbitration Rises, NAT’L L. J., Mar. 27, 2006, at 2 (“Investor-state arbitrations are
disputes governed by investment treaties (BITs), treaties created by two countries
to govern investments between them.”).
4. Matthew Hodgson, Counting the Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration,
9 Global Arb. Rev., no. 2, Mar. 24, 2014, at 4–6. These figures have increased in
the last seven years, when the average amount claimed was USD $343,400,000.
Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 57–58 (2007).
5. See Charles T. Kotuby & Luke A. Sobota, Practical Suggestions to
Promote the Legitimacy and Vitality of International Investment Arbitration, 28
ICSID REV. 454, 454–55 (2013) (describing investor-state arbitrations as “complex
international disputes” involving “billions of dollars and the legitimacy of
sovereign acts” where the aggrieved investor may have “‘bet the company’ on the
panel’s decision.”).
6. See Fortado, supra note 3, at 2 (quoting Robert Volterra, global cochairman of the international dispute resolution group and head of the public
international law group in the London office of Latham & Watkins).
7. See Kotuby, supra note 5, at 458 n.20 (criticizing the parties’ voluminous
submissions to the tribunal, totaling 5,291 pages (citing Petroleum Corporation
and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Republic of Ecuador,
ICSID Case No ARB/06/11, Award (5 Oct. 2012) ¶ 103)).
8. 542 U.S. 241 (2004).
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the complexity, length, and expense of these arbitrations. In Intel’s
wake, U.S. courts have routinely allowed Section 1782 discovery in
aid of BIT arbitrations,9 proving that the statute can be used broadly
in the ISA context, potentially affecting the outcome of such
arbitrations. And now, with its ruling in Republic of Argentina v.
NML Capital, Ltd.,10 the Supreme Court has opened the door to broad
discovery relating to the execution of judgments against foreign
sovereigns, rejecting application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA). It seems possible that this decision will once again
increase the amount of discovery sought (and received) in aid of ISA
disputes, potentially increasing the length and cost of ISA
proceedings.
The increasing likelihood of U.S. discovery (through Section
1782 and otherwise) in aid of ISA disputes raises a question for
practitioners and their clients: is this development a blessing or a
curse? On the positive side, U.S. discovery allows for a more
fulsome vetting of the important issues of investor rights and state
sovereignty associated with ISA claims. Yet, it is often one-sided,
raising concerns about the fairness of the process. Moreover,
extensive discovery can be quite costly and inefficient, thereby
eliminating many of the benefits associated with arbitration.
Below, in Section I, we discuss the history and development of
Section 1782, culminating in the Intel decision. In Section II, we
address the developments arising out of Intel, namely the application
of Section 1782 to ISA disputes. In Section III, we discuss the NML
Capital ruling and its likely consequences. In Section IV, we
examine the benefits and disadvantages associated with the use of
Section 1782 discovery in ISA disputes. Finally, in Section V, we
propose ways that U.S. discovery can be used in ISA disputes in a
fair and positive manner.
II.

28 U.S.C. § 1782: THE INTEL REVOLUTION
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) reads, in relevant part:
The district court of the district in which a person
resides or is found may order him to give his
testimony or statement or to produce a document or
other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or

9. Roger P. Alford, Ancillary Discovery to Prove Denial of Justice, 53 VA. J.
INT’L L. 127, 128 (2012).
10. 134 S. Ct. 2250, 189 L. Ed. 2d 234 (2014).
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international
tribunal,
including
criminal
investigations conducted before formal accusation.
The order may be made pursuant to a . . . request
made[] by a foreign or international tribunal or upon
the application of any interested person . . . . The order
may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may
be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the
foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking
the testimony or statement or producing the document
or other thing. To the extent that the order does not
prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall
be taken, and the document or other thing produced, in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.11
The long history of Section 1782 traces back to 1855, when
Congress first enacted a statute empowering courts to appoint
commissioners to respond to letters rogatory and, thus, authorizing
courts to provide judicial assistance to foreign courts and litigants.12
The 1855 Act, however, did not succeed in providing greater
assistance to foreign courts, as the statute was indexed under
“mistrials,” and, as such, the Act was “lost” and disregarded by the
courts.13 In 1863, and seemingly unaware of the 1855 Act, Congress
passed significantly more restrictive legislation regarding discovery
in foreign cases, which essentially frustrated the effect of the 1855
Act.14
After World War II, and in light of the growth of international
commerce and foreign litigation, Congress enacted the Act of 1948,
which “adopted the ‘general’ approach of the 1855 Act and rejected
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2012).
12. Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630. (“That where letters
rogatory shall have be[en] addressed from any court of a foreign country to any
circuit court of the United States, and a United States commissioner designated by
said circuit court to make the examination of witnesses in said letters mentioned,
said commissioner shall be empowered to compel the witnesses to appear and
depose in the same manner as to appear and testify in court.”).
13. Walter B. Stahr, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Foreign and
International Proceedings, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 597, 601 & n.18 (1989); Michael
Campion Miller et al., 28 U.S.C. § 1782 and the Evolution of International Judicial
Assistance in the United States Courts, 59-May FED. L. 44, 1 (2012); Steven M.
Saraisky, How to Construe Section 1782: A Textual Prescription to Restore the
Judge’s Discretion, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1130 & n.12 (1994).
14. Stahr, supra note 13, at 601; Harry Leroy Jones, International Judicial
Assistance: Procedural Chaos and Program for Reform, 62 YALE L. J. 515, 540
(1953).
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the ‘limitations’ of the 1863 Act.”15 Still, this approach was
perceived by critics as “unduly narrow” and not sufficiently broad to
address the “new era of international cooperation and litigation.” 16
So, in 1964, Congress passed further amendments intended to
liberalize the statute and to entice other countries to broaden their
judicial assistance to foreign tribunals. 17 The latest amendment to
Section 1782 was enacted in 1996, at which time Congress expanded
the statute’s reach once again. 18 Since 1996, federal courts have
heard numerous Section 1782 applications and have differed
significantly on the interpretation of the statute in various ways. 19
In 2004, with its seminal decision in Intel Corp. v. Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court resolved many of the
differences that had developed among the courts with respect to the
interpretation of Section 1782. The Intel dispute arose out of a
complaint filed by Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD), one of
Intel’s archrivals, with the Directorate General for Competition of the
Commission of the European Communities (DG-Competition),
alleging that Intel violated European Union antitrust law.20 After the
DG-Competition declined to seek judicial assistance in the United
15. Stahr, supra note 13, at 602–03 (suggesting Congress found the misplaced
1855 Act).
16. Id. at 603–04; Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States
Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1015, 1026 (1965)).
17. S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 8–9 (1964).
18. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No.
104–106, § 1342(b), 110 Stat. 486 (1996).
19. For example, the courts disagreed on whether Section 1782 imposed a
foreign discoverability requirement, compare In re Asta Medica, S. A., 981 F.2d 1,
7 (1st Cir. 1992), and In re Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848
F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that Section 1782 imposed a foreign
discoverability requirement), with In re Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 59–60 (2d Cir.
1993), and In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188, 193–94 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the
foreign discoverability requirement); whether the foreign proceeding had to be
pending or imminent, compare In re Crown Prosecution Serv. of United Kingdom,
870 F.2d 686, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (concluding that the proceeding must be
“within reasonable contemplation”), with In re Ishihara Chemical Co., 251 F.3d
120, 125 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the foreign proceeding must be “imminent—
very likely to occur and very soon to occur”); and the type of foreign or
international tribunal that qualifies for assistance under Section 1782, compare In
re Medway Power Ltd., 985 F. Supp. 402, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that
“arbitration is not a tribunal for the purpose of Section 1782” because “Congress
intended to assist official, governmental bodies” and not unofficial, private
arbitrations), with In re Technostroyexport, 853 F. Supp. 695, 697‒98 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (holding that a private arbitral tribunal is a foreign tribunal under § 1782, but
denying the request because Technostroy did not obtain a ruling from the arbitral
tribunal that discovery should take place).
20. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 246 (2004).
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States, AMD filed a Section 1782 petition in the Northern District of
California seeking discovery from Intel for use in the antitrust
proceeding.21
The Court had to determine whether these facts met the statutory
requirements for Section 1782 discovery, which are: (1) that the
target of the discovery request must reside or be “found” in the
district court where the Section 1782 petition was filed; (2) that the
purpose of the discovery must be for use in a “proceeding”; (3) that
the “proceeding” in question must take place before a foreign or
international tribunal; and (4) that the Section 1782 discovery request
must be made by the foreign or international tribunal itself, or by an
“interested person.”22 The Court noted, however, that Section 1782
“authorizes, but does not require, . . . discovery assistance” for use in
a foreign proceeding.23 Thus, once the required elements of the
statute are met, a court deciding a Section 1782 application still has
discretion on whether to grant judicial assistance.
The Intel Court therefore provided a list of non-exclusive factors
that a court should consider in exercising its discretion, such as
whether “the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant
in a foreign proceeding”; “the nature of the foreign tribunal, the
character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of
the foreign government . . . to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance”;
whether “the [Section] 1782(a) request conceals an attempt to
circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a
foreign country or the United States”; and whether the request is
“unduly intrusive or burdensome.” 24
This mix of statutory and discretionary factors has become
known as the Intel test. In addition to setting the modern standard for
Section 1782 discovery, Intel is also known for expanding the scope
and use of the statute.
The Intel Court ruled upon four important points that were
subject to disagreement among the Circuits: (1) whether Section 1782
imposes a foreign discoverability requirement; (2) the parties to
whom the court’s assistance is available; (3) whether the proceeding
must be pending or otherwise imminent before a foreign or
21. Id. at 250–51.
22. See id. at 249 (determining whether these facts met the 1782 requirements);
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
23. Intel, 542 U.S. at 266.
24. Id. at 264–65.
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international tribunal; and (4) whether DG-Competition
investigations (and other “quasi-judicial” functions) qualify as
proceedings under the statute.25
The Court answered each of these questions in a manner that
favored expanded discovery under Section 1782. As to the proposed
“foreign discoverability requirement,” the Court held that “[b]eyond
shielding material safeguarded by an applicable privilege, . . . nothing
in the text of §1782 limits a district court’s production-order authority
to materials that could be discovered in the foreign jurisdiction if the
materials were located there.”26 Next, the Court held that the text of
the statute, “‘upon the application of any interested person,’ plainly
reaches beyond the universe of persons designated ‘litigant’” to
include a person who “possess[es] a reasonable interest in obtaining
[judicial] assistance.” 27 The Intel Court rejected the notion that the
foreign proceeding in question must be pending, or even “imminent.”
Rather, the court found that the test was whether “a dispositive
ruling . . . [was] within reasonable contemplation.” 28
Finally, relying on the legislative history of Section 1782, the
Court held that the DG-Competition was a “foreign or international
tribunal” under the statute, which extends to administrative and
quasi-judicial agencies.29 Importantly for our purposes, the Court
noted that, according to at least one source, “the term ‘tribunal’ . . .
includes investigating magistrates, administrative and arbitral
tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies, as well as conventional civil,
commercial, criminal, and administrative courts.”30
III. POST-INTEL: THE U.S. COURTS EXPAND SECTION 1782 TO BIT
ARBITRATION
In the wake of Intel, the Courts began to apply Section 1782
much more broadly and in a number of different contexts. For our
purposes, however, only one is truly important: the U.S. Courts—
which had previously opposed the use of Section 1782 in
25. Id. at 246–47; Roger J. Johns & Anne Keaty, The New and Improved
Section 1782: Supercharging Federal District Court Discovery Assistance to
Foreign and International Tribunals, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 649, 650–51 (2006).
26. Intel, 542 U.S. at 260.
27. Id. at 256.
28. Id. at 259.
29. Id. at 243, 257–58 (quoting 63 Stat. 1743; S. REP. NO. 88–1580, at 7–8).
30. Id. at 258 (quoting Smit, supra note 16, at 1026 n.71, 1027 n.73 (emphasis
added)).
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“arbitration-related matters”31—began to authorize its use in the
arbitration context. In the words of one jurist: “The judicial
prohibition on using Section 1782 in connection with arbitral
proceedings was absolute and largely unquestioned until 2004, when
the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a more expansive interpretation of
the term ‘foreign or international tribunal’ than had previously been
seen in the lower courts.”32 After Intel, at least with respect to
Investor-State (treaty-based) arbitrations, 33 the U.S. federal courts
committed a complete reversal. Virtually all federal courts that have
addressed the question now “agree that an arbitral tribunal
established pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty constitutes an
‘international tribunal’ within the meaning of the statute.”34
Interestingly, many of these Section 1782 actions arise out of a
single (yet long-running and massive) dispute between Chevron
Corporation and the Republic of Ecuador.35 This cross-border dispute
has spawned not only multiple lawsuits in the U.S. and in Ecuador,
but also an investor-state arbitration under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT and
numerous enforcement proceedings around the globe. 36 Both sides to
31. Strong, supra note 1, at 302; see also Alford, supra note 9, at 133–34
(“Before 2004 it was widely assumed that Section 1782 discovery orders were
unavailable in aid of international arbitration.”); NBC v. Bear Stearns, 165 F.3d
184, 190‒91 (concluding that Section 1782 does not cover international arbitration
because arbitration is a creature of contract where the parties could have set up
discovery procedures; therefore, opening the door to broad discovery would
undermine significantly the advantages of arbitration); Rep. of Kazakhstan v.
Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999) (reversing the lower court and
finding that “the term ‘foreign and international tribunals’ in § 1782 was not
intended to authorize resort to United States federal courts to assist discovery in
private international arbitrations”); In re Medway Power Ltd., 985 F. Supp. 402,
403 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Section 1782 does not apply to international arbitration).
32. Strong, supra note 1, at 302.
33. The courts are split on whether private international commercial arbitration
qualifies under the statute. See Alford, supra note 9, at 135–36 nn.47 & 51; see also
Strong, supra note 1, at 315 n.112.
34. Alford, supra note 9, at 136; see, e.g., In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153,
161 (3d Cir. 2011) (Investor-State UNCITRAL arbitration qualifies as a foreign
tribunal under 1782); In re Mesa Power Grp., LLC, 878 F. Supp. 1296, 1302–03
(S.D. Fla. 2012) (same); Rep. of Ecuador v. Bjorkman, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1124
(D. Col. 2011) (same); In re Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 291 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) aff’d 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011) (same); Chevron Corp. v. Shefftz, 754 F.
Supp. 2d 254, 260 (D. Mass. 2010) (same); In re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d 8, 22
(D.D.C. 2010) (same); In re Chevron Corp., No. 1:10-MI-0076-TWT-GGB, 2010
WL 8767265, *4 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 2, 2010) (same). But see Rep. of Ecuador v.
Connor, 708 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 2013) (ruling on grounds of estoppel and
thereby circumventing the issue, leaving unaltered existing precedent that an
international arbitration tribunal is not a tribunal under Section 1782).
35. Alford, supra note 9, at 137.
36. See, e.g., Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, NEW YORKER (Jan. 9,
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the dispute (Chevron and Ecuador) have filed numerous Section 1782
proceedings seeking U.S. discovery from non-party witnesses. 37
The evidence collected through the Section 1782 proceedings
has enabled Chevron and Ecuador to introduce evidence in the BIT
proceedings that they otherwise likely would not have been able to
obtain.38 This is because discovery in BIT arbitrations generally is
governed by the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence, under which
depositions are very rare (witness testimony is provided in written
statements),39 interrogatories are uncommon, and only “narrow and
specific” requests for documents are allowed. 40 Fishing expeditions
are simply not permitted.41 And, perhaps most importantly, BIT
2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/09/reversal-of-fortune2?currentPage=all (initial suit commenced by the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs in the town
of Lago Agrio, Ecuador in May 2003 and resulted in a judgment against Chevron
for USD $18 billion); Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Corp. v. The Rep. of
Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Claimants’ Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 3
(UNCITRAL arbitration initiated by Chevron alleging that Ecuador breached the
Ecuador-U.S. BIT and investment agreements); Yaiguaje v Chevron Corp., [2013]
ONSC 2527 (Can.) (enforcement action related to litigation in Ecuador).
37. Alford, supra note 9, at 143–45; see, e.g., Rep. of Ecuador v. Connor, 708
F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 2013); Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011);
In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2011); Rep. of Ecuador v. Bjorkman,
801 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (D. Col. 2011); In re Rep. of Ecuador, No. 2:11-mc-00052
GSA, 2011 WL 4089189 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2011); In re Rep. of Ecuador, Nos. C
11-80171 CRB, C 11-80172 CRB, 2011 WL 4434816 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2011);
Chevron Corp. v. Shefftz, 754 F. Supp. 2d 254 (D. Mass 2010); In re Chevron
Corp., et al., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Veiga, F. Supp. 2d 8
(D.D.C. 2010); In re Chevron Corp., 753 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D. Md. 2010); In re
Chevron Corp., No. 2:10-cv-02675(SRC), 2010 WL 8767338 (D.N.J. June 15,
2010); Chevron Corp. v. Champ, Nos. 1:10mc 27, 1:10mc 28, 2010 WL 3418394
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 30, 2010); In re Chevron Corp., No. 3:10-cv-00686, 2010 L
8767266 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 17, 2010); In re Rep. of Ecuador, No. C-10-80225
MISC., 2010 WL 3702427 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2010); In re Rep. of Ecuador, No.
1:10-mc-00040 GSA, 2010 WL 4027740 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2010); In re Chevron
Corp., No. 1:10-MI-0076-TWT-GGB, 2010 WL 8767265 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 2, 2010);
In re Rep. of Ecuador, No. 4:11mc73-RH/WCS, 2011 WL 10618727 (N.D. Fla.
Aug. 24, 2011).
38. Alford, supra note 9, at 146–47.
39. See IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration,
International Bar Association (29 May 2010) art. 4 [hereinafter “IBA Rules”]
(providing that “each Party shall identify the witnesses on whose testimony it
intends to rely and the subject matter of that testimony” and “[t]he Arbitral
Tribunal may order each Party to submit within a specified time to the Arbitral
Tribunal and to the other Parties Witness Statements by each witness”).
40. See IBA Rules art. 3(3)(a) (“A Request to Produce [documents] shall
contain: . . . (i) a description of each requested Document sufficient to identify it, or
(ii) a description in sufficient detail (including subject matter) of a narrow and
specific requested category of Documents that are reasonably believed to exist.”).
41. Alford, supra note 9, at 142; compare IBA Rules arts. 2(3), 3(3)(b) (where
the standard applied to evidence requests is that the information must be “relevant
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tribunals generally “have no authority to request documents or oral
testimony” from non-parties. 42 It is in this last regard—non-party
discovery—where Section 1782 is able to fill the biggest gap.
Chevron’s denial-of-justice BIT claim is still pending, but
Chevron has received several favorable interim orders and awards
that may not have been rendered in the absence of the evidence
collected using Section 1782.43 For instance, on January 25, 2012,
the tribunal issued an interim award directing Ecuador to “take all
measures at its disposal to suspend or cause to be suspended the
enforcement or recognition within and without Ecuador against any
judgment against [Chevron] in the Lago Agrio Case” and to inform
the tribunal as to the measures taken for the implementation of the
Interim Award.44 Less than a month later, the tribunal restated this
order and added that Ecuador should institute “measures to preclude
any certification by [Ecuador] that would cause the said judgments to
be enforceable against [Chevron].”45 Although the interim awards do
not provide the tribunal’s reasoning for reaching its decisions,
Claimants’ Request for Interim Measures shows that Chevron
provided the tribunal with evidence—in the form of depositions and
emails—obtained through discovery requests in the U.S.46 This shows
that Section 1782 has at least the potential to be a game-changer in
certain BIT arbitrations.
IV. WILL ARGENTINA V. NML CAPITAL FURTHER INCREASE
DISCOVERY IN ISA DISPUTES?
In 2014, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Republic of
Argentina v. NML Capital Ltd., which allowed broad discovery
relating to the execution of judgments against a sovereign state,
rejecting application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)
to the case and material to its outcome”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (which
allows discovery of any information that “appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence,” even if the information sought is itself
inadmissible).
42. Alford, supra note 9, at 142.
43. Id. at 146–47.
44. Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Corp. v. The Rep. of Ecuador, PCA
Case No. 2009-23, First Interim Award on Interim Measures, 16 (Jan. 25, 2012).
45. Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Corp. v. The Rep. of Ecuador, PCA
Case No. 2009-23, Second Interim Award on Interim Measures, ¶ 3 (Feb. 16,
2012).
46. Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Corp. v. The Rep. of Ecuador, PCA
Case No. 2009-23, Claimants’ Request for Interim Measures dated, ¶¶ 51, 58,
157‒58 (Apr. 1, 2010).
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in that context and effectively limiting the FSIA to its express terms. 47
The dispute arose out of Argentina’s 2001 default on its external debt
and its subsequent offer to restructure its outstanding bonds. 48
Although most of the bondholders agreed with the restructuring plan,
NML did not.49 Instead, “NML brought 11 actions against Argentina
in the Southern District of New York to collect on its debt, and
prevailed in every one.”50 The problem for NML, however, is that it
has not been able to execute any of the judgments.
In an attempt to locate Argentina’s property, NML requested
discovery from two banks (Bank of America and Banco de la Nación
Argentina) seeking documents relating to Argentina’s assets, their
location, records, history, etc.51 Argentina opposed this discovery
request on the ground that the FSIA prohibits a court from ordering
discovery of assets owned by a foreign sovereign because those
assets are immune. 52 The narrow issue for the Court was whether the
FSIA “imposes a limit on a United States court’s authority to order
blanket post-judgment execution discovery on the assets of a foreign
state used for any activity anywhere in the world.”53 The Court
held—in a 7-1 decision—that the FSIA provides jurisdictional and
execution immunity to a foreign sovereign, but that it does not
provide immunity from discovery of the sovereign’s assets in the
U.S. or abroad.54
Of particular note is the Court’s statement that: “[A]ny sort of
immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in an American court
must stand on the Act’s text. Or it must fail.” 55 Applying this rule,
the Court found that “[t]here is no . . . provision forbidding or
limiting discovery in aid of execution of a foreign-sovereign
judgment debtor’s assets” in the FSIA, 56 and therefore rejected
Argentina’s arguments under the FSIA.

47. See NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. at 2256 (discussing the FSIA’s silence on
limiting discovery against sovereign states).
48. Id. at 2253.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2254.
53. NML Capital, 134 S. Ct., at 2255.
54. Id. at 2253–59.
55. Id. at 2256.
56. Id. (“The Act speaks of discovery only once, in a subsection requiring
courts to stay discovery requests directed to the United States that would interfere
with criminal or national-security matters.”).
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Does this open the door to Section 1782 discovery directly
against a sovereign respondent or its agents or instrumentalities in a
BIT case? To the best of our knowledge, no such Section 1782
petition has ever been attempted. However, a few months ago, in
Mare Shipping, Inc. v. Squire Sanders, LLP,57 one litigant came close.
There, Mare filed a Section 1782 application seeking discovery from
Spain’s U.S. attorneys (Squire Sanders). 58 The court found, based on
NML Capital and a textual reading of the FSIA, that a foreign
sovereign’s U.S. counsel is excluded from the definition of
“sovereign, or its ‘agency or instrumentality’” under the FSIA. 59
Therefore, Section 1782 discovery would be permitted.60 In adhering
to a textual reading of the FSIA, the Supreme Court and the Second
Circuit seemed to agree with the proposition that a discovery order
directed at a third party does not infringe a sovereign’s immunity
under the FSIA because compliance will cause the sovereign “no
burden and no expense” so long as the subpoenas do not reveal
sensitive information. 61
As demonstrated by the Mare case, the NML Capital decision
makes it more likely that investor-state claimants may soon try to
seek Section 1782 discovery directly against a sovereign opponent in
an ISA dispute. Whether or not they would succeed is a complicated
question for another day. In particular, pursuant to the FSIA, foreign
states are immune from “the jurisdiction” of the United States
courts.62 As a result, any attempt to seek discovery directly from a
foreign sovereign through Section 1782 would presumably have to
satisfy one of the exceptions to the FSIA, 63 making for a complicated
analysis. Nonetheless, given what seems to be an ever-expanding
scope of U.S. discovery in aid of international investor-state
arbitration, we all should be asking: is this shift a blessing or a curse?

57. Mare Shipping, Inc. v. Squire Sanders, LLP, 574 F. App’x. 6 (2d Cir.
2014).
58. Id. at 6–7
59. Id. at 9.
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 210 (2d Cir.
2012), aff’d, NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. 2250).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)-(6) (2008) (providing exceptions to
jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state).
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IS DISCOVERY IN AID OF INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION A
BLESSING OR A CURSE?

There are several arguments in favor of U.S. discovery in aid of
Investor-State arbitrations. First, as Justice Brandeis once famously
said, “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”64 In other
words, the idea that a full vetting of the facts of each case leads to the
truth is what drives the U.S. system of discovery. In the case of
Investor-State arbitrations, where the sovereign functions of a state
are alleged to have violated international law, important questions
related to public policy and the global investment climate are at
issue.65 One could certainly argue that this is a space in which
maximum “sunlight” is desirable.
Second, sovereign respondents are considered favored by certain
“procedural asymmetries” in investment arbitrations, giving States an
ability (and an incentive) to make it difficult for investors to prove
their case.66 Take, for example, a typical denial-of-justice case,
where evidence of judicial bias, ex parte communications, and even
bribe-taking could easily be hidden by the State and therefore would
be unavailable to the claimant-investor absent Section 1782 discovery
(or another type of discovery) from non-party witnesses.67 In this
light, one can argue that Section 1782 may be essential to seeing
justice done in certain ISA disputes.
Third, and relatedly, Section 1782 discovery allows for an
examination of evidence held by non-parties, who (as noted above)
are usually outside the scope of discovery in international arbitration
matters.68 This is important, because (as noted above) parties that are
inclined to violate principles of law and rules of conduct are often not
opposed to hiding evidence in the context of a dispute arising out of
their wrongdoing. If an arbitration party’s only source of evidence is
her opponent, she may never receive the materials needed to prove
64. LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY – AND HOW BANKERS USE IT
92 (1914).
65. See Kotuby, supra note 5, at 455–56 (citing Toby T. Landau, Reasons for
Reasons: The Tribunal’s Duty in Investor-State Arbitration, in 50 YEARS OF THE
NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICCA INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONFERENCE,
ICCA CONGRESS SERIES 195, 202 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2009). See also
Critical Case Studies, THE REASONS REQUIREMENT IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 2 (Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & W. Michael Reisman eds. 2008)
(concluding that “the reasons requirement . . . acquires a greater importance in
international investment arbitration” than commercial arbitration)).
66. Strong, supra note 1, at 359 & n.381.
67. See Alford, supra note 9, at 146.
68. Id. at 150.

03 - GORSLINEPICAS (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

5/6/2015 10:31 AM

U.S. DISCOVERY IN ISAS: A BLESSING OR A CURSE

27

her case. However, if she can access evidence in the hands of nonparties, through the compulsory discovery process of the U.S. federal
courts, her chances of prevailing increase dramatically. In this
regard, Section 1782 could increase the likelihood that the truth will
emerge. 69
Finally, Section 1782 discovery has the potential to alter a Host
State’s incentives and force the state to “reconcile[ ] international
obligations with domestic political preferences.” 70 In other words,
expanded discovery may have a positive deterrent effect in favor of
the Rule of Law. Many states (and their leaders) face a domestic
political climate in which foreign investors are negatively viewed as
outsiders intent on stripping the country of its wealth and resources
for export. When faced only with such a domestic political
landscape, the sovereign is easily tempted to take expropriatory
action against foreign investors, to the satisfaction of the local
constituency. When currying favor with the local populace comes at
the potential cost of being forced by a BIT tribunal to pay millions of
dollars in damages to the foreign investor, however, the calculus
changes. And satisfying domestic political whims becomes even less
appealing if it is likely that the damaged investor can use Section
1782 to discover concrete evidence against the expropriating state.
But the foregoing benefits come at a cost—one that some would
argue is too steep to pay. The most obvious disadvantage of Section
1782 discovery in ISA disputes is the one that started off our
discussion: arbitration generally is supposed to be—and usually is
expected to be—a faster, cheaper, more efficient alternative to
litigation. That is one reason why parties choose to enter into
arbitration agreements and investment treaties. But the introduction
of U.S. discovery into the mix certainly has at least the potential to
eliminate those benefits. 71 This is especially true when one considers
that some federal courts have found that Section 1782 and the Federal
69. An additional benefit may be the ability to verify the veracity of a claim
before going to the expense of bringing an investor-state dispute. Because Section
1782 can be used in cases where the foreign or international proceeding is not
imminent, but only within reasonable contemplation, see Intel, 542 U.S. at 259, at
least one court has held that Section 1782 can be used with respect to an
anticipated, but as yet unnoticed, arbitration. See In re Application of Winning
(HK) Shipping Co., No. 09-22659-MC, 2010 WL 1796579, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Apr.
30, 2010) (denying motion to quash discovery for use in an unfiled, anticipated
arbitration). One can argue that, in this way, Section 1782 could be used to
investigate and further meritorious claims, while weeding out the weak or frivolous
ones.
70. Alford, supra note 9, at 129.
71. Strong, supra note 1, at 302 & n.33, 319; Alford, supra note 9, at 153.
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Rules of Civil Procedure authorize discovery of any materials within
the possession, custody, or control of the person “found” in the U.S.,
even if that material is located all over the globe. 72 As noted above,
however, Investor-State arbitration has never truly fit into the “faster,
cheaper” mold of arbitration, and it seems unlikely that the parties to
such cases are focused on efficiency and cost. Rather, they are
probably focused on having a neutral, expert panel of public
international jurists to decide complex and weighty issues of
international law. Nonetheless, there are other, even stronger
criticisms of using Section 1782 discovery in ISA disputes.
As Professor Strong has noted, while U.S. lawyers are familiar,
and therefore comfortable, with American-style discovery, most nonU.S. lawyers and clients view it with absolute “horror,” as it is so
much more invasive and expensive than their own legal systems
would permit. 73 The fact that U.S. courts have so much “discretion”
in granting Section 1782 petitions does nothing to alleviate that fear,
as it opens the door for judicially-sanctioned harassment in cases
gone wrong.74
Another common criticism of Section 1782 discovery is that it is
“one-sided” and therefore inherently unfair. It will be the rare
investor-state case (like the Chevron-Ecuador dispute) where
discovery supportive of both sides is available from a person “found”
in the United States. This means that one party to an ISA dispute
would have access to broad Section 1782 discovery, while the other
side would be limited to the much more modest discovery available
under the IBA Rules (or another state’s applicable domestic
procedures).75 The unfairness inherent in such a scenario is obvious.
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE USE OF SECTION 1782 IN
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATIONS GOING FORWARD
Given the valid concerns listed above, how can the U.S. Courts
ensure that Section 1782 is used to benefit, and not abuse, the
evidence-gathering process in Investor-State arbitrations? One
72. In re Chevron, No. 11-24599-CV, 2012 WL 3636925, at *9 (S.D. Fla. June
12, 2012); In re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d 8, 25 (D.D.C. 2010) (exercising discretion
to grant discovery of documents in possession, custody or control of the person
from whom the documents were requested even though the documents were located
abroad).
73. Strong, supra note 1, at 351; Alford, supra note 9, at 139, 141.
74. Strong, supra note 1, at 351–52; Alford, supra note 9, at 150 (noting the
potential for “abuse” of Section 1782 discovery).
75. Cf. Alford, supra note 9, at 142.
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suggestion for capitalizing on the benefits of Section 1782 discovery
while minimizing the harms would be to order that any discovery
sought be “reciprocal.” This approach would eliminate one of the
major criticisms of expanded discovery—its inherent one-sidedness.
Reciprocal discovery would also counsel in favor of more modest
Section 1782 applications if the applicant knows he could be ordered
to produce discovery of a similar scope. That a district court would
have discretion to order reciprocal discovery is clear from the Intel
decision itself, where the Court explicitly stated that “a district court
could condition relief [under the statute] upon [the applicant’s]
reciprocal exchange of information.”76
Another suggestion, trumpeted by Professor Alford, is that
federal courts use their statutory discretion to “limit discovery to that
which is available in international arbitration or foreign
proceedings.”77 This would eliminate concerns about one-sidedness,
while also mitigating non-U.S. fears about the horrors of American
discovery. That said, such a restriction would seemingly prevent
parties to BIT arbitrations from getting access to otherwise
inaccessible—yet necessary—materials in support of their public
international law claims. 78 Thus, this type of limitation on Section
1782 discovery would have to be approached with care, probably by
granting any reasonable discovery requests that would technically be
allowed under the IBA Rules, no matter how unlikely such discovery
might be in the practice of ISA cases.
Finally, we suggest that U.S. Courts faced with Section 1782
petitions should exercise their broad discretion in other ways to
ensure that the statute is used fairly and properly. Indeed, the Courts
have already done so, exercising their discretion to: (i) disallow

76. Intel, 542 U.S. at 262.
77. Alford, supra note 9, at 153.
78. For instance, in the Chevron cases much of the evidence was obtained in
the form of non-party deposition testimony, see Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 1:11cv-00691-LAK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2014) (Docket No. 1874) (noting that
“[m]uch of the evidence in this case,” which came in the form of depositions,
emails and a trove of documents, was obtained through a Section 1782 proceeding
in In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom.
Lago Agrio Plaintiffs v. Chevron Corp., 409 F. App’x 393 (2d Cir. 2010)), which is
generally disallowed under the IBA Rules. See R. Doak Bishop, James Crawford &
W. Michael Reisman, FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS AND
COMMENTARY 15, § 1.10 (2005) (explaining that, although international
arbitrations do not have formal rules of taking evidence, tribunals often refer to the
IBA Rules, under which voluminous discovery involving broad-category document
requests and oral depositions are usually not permitted, unless the parties agree).
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discovery that is otherwise authorized by the statute;79 (ii) limit the
type or amount of discovery that is ultimately authorized; 80 and (iii)
place conditions on the use of that discovery, such as subjecting the
materials produced to a confidentiality agreement or protective
order.81
By implementing such limiting principles on the use of Section
1782 discovery, the statute can be used to benefit ISA disputes
without harming the process.

79. See, e.g., In re Application of Inversiones y Gasolinera Petroleos
Valenzuela, 2011 WL 181211, at *16-17 (finding that the statutory prerequisites for
Section 1782 are present, but nonetheless denying petitioner’s motion to compel
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45).
80. See, e.g., In re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 25 (refusing to hold that Section
1782 limits discovery to documents physically located in the United States, but
nevertheless exercising its discretion to so limit the discovery ordered in this case).
81. In re HydroDive Nigeria Ltd., No 13-MC-0477, slip op. at 10 (S.D. Tex.
May 29, 2013) (subjecting all discovery ordered to the provisions of an attorney’s
eyes only confidentiality agreement, to mitigate the concerns of the Respondent
corporation).

